Nulla etiam ratione: Cicero’s Roman Fideism in ND 3

David C. Noe (University of Iowa)

In this paper I will argue that Cicero’s claim to be an Academic philosopher is seriously undercut by his adoption of a fideistic position. This is seen by his close identification with Cotta in book 3 of De Natura Deorum (ND), who expressly and repeatedly excludes, in a fashion repugnant to Academism, any considerations of reason in the treatment of Roman religion.

ND 3 shows a direct confrontation between Stoic dogmatism and Academic skepticism on four topics: deos esse, dei quales sint, mundum a deis administrari, and deos generi humano consulere. In ND 1 and 2, Cicero expresses considerable agreement with the Stoic contention deos esse and for nature’s guiding humans toward the truth (duce natura). This fits with the Stoics’ fourfold identification of ratio, natura, mundus, and deus/dei. As ND 3 begins, the Academic Cotta takes issue with these four contentions. Before that Cicero establishes identity between himself and Cotta through a series of unmistakable correspondences in rhetorical strategies in his own statements in Fin. 3.1ff. and Cotta’s in ND 3.

As the argument begins, Cotta says that he has not forgotten his responsibility as pontifex maximus, but instead will always defend the religious beliefs received a maioribus. Cotta gives a complete list of these beliefs and draws an explicit distinction between things received a maioribus and the fruits of Hellenistic philosophy. He then states emphatically that no argument will dissuade him from the opinion received, repeating his signal criterion, a maioribus, concerning the immortal gods. From his Stoic opponent Balbus, Cotta seeks the ratio religionis, while from the ancestors, a maioribus a third time, he believes etiam nulla ratione. This last is quite remarkable from an Academic, who boasts in trusting nothing more than ratio, and nothing less than auctoritas. Yet he explicitly disavows the operation of any ratio (etiam nulla ratione) in his conclusion, and accepts the religious pronouncements of the Roman authorities ipso facto.

In addressing Balbus’ contention deos esse, Cotta reiterates that this is a position he accepts auctoritate maiorum, though there is no persuasive ratio for it. Instead, Cotta maintains, Balbus ought like himself to count Roman ancestral authority (maiores nostros tradidisse) conclusive and not despise their auctoritas. This is now the fifth time in the space of 5 sections that Cotta has conjoined religion and auctoritas. He thus develops the surprising theme that Stoics undermine received Roman religion by attempting to supply it with indefensible reasons, and holds that no particle of his own belief is threatened, since it never claimed a rational basis, but instead was grounded on bare claims of ancestral auctoritas. Through his many protestations of belief based solely on auctoritas maiorum, he has refused to subject Roman religion to ratio. Thus an Academic can remain a pious Roman only by expressly refusing to submit traditional religious claims to the scrutiny of ratio.

It is significant that Cotta does not affirm intellego deos esse on the basis of Roman auctoritas at any point in the dialogue. This is consistent because intellego and ratio cannot be separated, credo and ratio can. Cotta, however, consciously divorces his belief from ratio. This divergence is not a conflict between ratio and auctoritas, as Cotta deliberately ignored the former in the process of his own belief formation. Thus in Cicero’s identification with Cotta, he verges toward fideism and thereby invalidates his claim to be an Academic philosopher.